Based on market prices and other market inputs to value assets and liabilities, adopting fair value measurement creates many unpredictable economic consequences, such as amplifying the vicious cycle of falling prices during a worldwide financial crisis. This paper investigates whether markingto-market disclosure affects the commonality in liquidity. Commonality in liquidity is defined as the sensitivity of stock liquidity to the variation in market liquidity. I find marking-to-market disclosure is associated with higher commonality in liquidity. In addition, I find that higher commonality in liquidity is associated with lower stock liquidity. I also find the positive association between commonality in liquidity and stock illiquidity is mitigated by the effect of government guarantee. 
I. Introduction
The financial reporting environment changed significantly in 2005 for thousands of public companies around the world when dozens of countries simultaneously mandated the adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). Most literature studying on IFRS typically focus on the information transparency and expected economic consequence, such as reduction of cost of capital ( Daske et al. (2008) ), increase foreign investment and improvement of liquidity ( Li (2010) ; DeFond et al. (2015) ).
In this study, I investigate the relation between the adoption of mark-to-market accounting, a major new feature of China Accounting Standard (CAS) and commonality in liquidity. I further study how government guarantee influences such liquidity risk. Commonality in liquidity is defined as the sensitivity of stock liquidity to the variation in market liquidity ( Chordia et al. (2000) ; Kamara et al. (2008) ) The sensitivity between stock liquidity and market liquidity becomes a serious concern if illiquidity occurs at inopportune times. When market liquidity declines, different stocks experience different liquidity downside pressure. In particular, the liquidity downside pressure is more significant for those stocks' liquidity highly correlated with the market liquidity, eliminating the opportunity for a trader to exit a position.
To the best of my knowledge a theoretical or empirical model that directly links the implementation of IFRS and systematic liquidity risk is not available, but the intuition is as follows. According to Kyle (1985) , the stock liquidity is negatively correlated with the variation of stock fundamental values. I hypothesize that through the mark-to-market regime, fair value disclosure forces the fluctuation of firm asset value to co-move with that of the market, leading to the convergence of individual stock liquidity to market liquidity.
I investigate the relation between fair value disclosure and commonality in liquidity by examining how fair value measurements contribute to the commonality in liquidity of stock list in China stock market in the new CAS years of 2007 and 2008 . I find evidences of a positive association between fair value disclosure and commonality in liquidity.
Next, I examine the economic significance of the effect of commonality in liquidity on stock illiquidity. I find stock with higher liquidity commonality will experience lower stock liquidity. In addition, by using state ownership as a proxy for the signaling effect of government guarantee, I
investigate how government guarantee effect mitigates the impact of liquidity commonality risk.
In particular, I find that firms with state ownership will significantly reduce the illiquidity effect of commonality risk. This result indicates that government may play a key role in defending the liquidity downside pressure during financial crisis. My study provides a new perspective for analyzing the deterioration of financial systems during a market crisis period and the importance of government response.
By reducing uncertainty about intrinsic value, the government as a means of getting an economy out of an liquidity freeze spiral. Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) and Vayanos (2004) determine a side reason for liquidity dry-up -the concept of flight to quality, where liquidity providers avoid supporting firms because of a high level of uncertainty about the fundamental value of firms and about the ability to raise sufficient financial support. To the extent that a government-backed firm provides guarantee signals about, for example, having sufficient operating cash support or offering help as a lender of last resort from government, the uncertainty about future cash inflow is relief, reducing the sensitivity of liquidity to market liquidity shock.
The China dataset allows me to uniquely test the effect of government intervention when adopting fair value disclosure. First, by virtue of heritage and design, all public Chinese firms have a dominant/controlling shareholder, on which this paper investigates the intervention from government as a means to control the crisis. Second, the China setting seems inherently interesting because the effects of the recent financial crisis varied markedly across different economic settings, and the precipitating factors of China's success against the financial crisis are not well understood. Third, global market liberalization and international fund flows are limited in China. Global investors may transmit liquidity shock from one market to other markets, or may arbitrage away liquidity pressure in some markets, thus distorting the liquidity effect from the operation of fair value disclosure. The well-known 1998 episode involving Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM) represents a notable example of arbitraging away liquidity among different markets. The hedge fund was highly leveraged and by design had positive sensitivity to market-wide liquidity across a variety of markets, by arbitrage to long less liquidity instruments and short more liquidity instrument.
The Chinese capital market mechanism also provides unique data to verify the effect of the economic influence of government, the ultimate property right owner of China state-owned enterprises(SOEs), over the result of market crisis. Specifically and as a first point, SOEs have preferential access to capital. Stock market regulators give preferential treatment by extending listing privileges to local and central SOEs based on political connection rather than economic objectives. For example, when local and central SOEs apply for listing, the government allows these firms to report the three years of pre-IPO earnings based on estimations, because they are typically restructured from a parent company immediately prior to the IPO (Companies Law No. 137, promulgated in July 1994; CSRC Share Issuance Announcement in December 1996) . This special provision enables these SOEs to provide favorable profit numbers, helping them to qualify for listing and to inflate their IPO prices (Aharony et al. (2000) ) . Non-state firms, in contrast, must have been in operation for three years prior to listing, and therefore need to report actual earnings. In addition, the Chinese government has significant control over how and where a firm can raise equity capital. For example, the government showcases the best performing or the most politically connected firms to list as H shares in the Hong Kong stock market or ADRs in the United States.
SOEs receive government backing, such as bailouts that provide financial insurance to outside shareholders. When these SOEs have financial problems, investors are likely to look to the ultimate control shareholder, the government, for resolution. The Chinese government has incentives to provide such a bailout because worker layoffs might lead to civil unrest. In contrast, without the protection afforded by the government, non-state firms operate under the financing difficulties brought about by financial crisis.
My findings first contribute to the economic consequence in adopting of IFRS ( Daske et al. (2008); Li (2010); DeFond et al. (2015) ), by investigating how the adopting IFRS contribute to commonality in liquidity in China, the world's largest emerging market. Commonality in liquidity is the sensitivity of stock liquidity to the variation in market liquidity. Most research in accounting focus on the first moment of liquidity, studying the relation between accounting disclosure and stock liquidity (e.g., Brown and Hillegeist (2007) ). This paper extends the finance literature of commonality in stock liquidity by linking commonality in liquidity (Chordia et al. (2000) ; Kamara et al. (2008); Hameed et al. (2010) )to accounting disclosure. This paper also contribution to the debate whether fair value measurement injects additional risk into capital market, such as distorted real decision (Plantin et al. (2008) ), excess volatility (Hodder et al. (2006) ), and information opacity risk (Riedl and Serafeim (2011) ). My results finds fair value disclosure will increase the commonality in liquidity. Higher commonality in liquidity is associated with lower stock liquidity. The capital market implication of this finding is as follows. When markets decline, individual stock prices tend to decline as well. When market makers and other intermediaries are constrained by their capital base, a large negative return reduces the pool of capital that is tied to marketable securities and, hence, reduces the supply of liquidity.
Finally, the contribution of this article is to provide an alternative government mechanism that is meant to get out of stock liquidity inefficiency. An important aspect of the 2008 financial crisis has been the contraction of stock liquidity. One standard government policy response to the inefficient "freeze" is interest rate reduction, like Federal Reserve and other central bank around the world response to recent financial crisis. Another prominent course of government policy is to infuse the capital into real economy and capital market. Several papers investigate "lender of last resort" to prevent from financial crisis ( Corsetti et al. (2006) ; Morris and Shin (2006) ), or preferential access to finance in emerging market (Khwaja and Mian (2005); Claessens et al. (2008) ). The policy problem I consider here is different by investigating how government provides the guarantee signals in capital market for those government-linked companies. Government guarantee effect is a credibility signal to the capital market that firms will acquire necessary government support during financial distress. This government-support mechanism appears to be more prominent in weakly developed banking sector in emerging market. Government intervention to real economy includes directly lending to nofinancial firms, provision of incentives to bank sector to lend to such firms, and even without wasting real resource to guarantee the limit loss of investment of banking system and investors.
II. Background and Literature Review
In (2010) ) to link to the adopting fair value measurement. In addition, my paper also consider the government guarantee mechanism that mitigate the commonality liquidity risk through the expectation of minority shareholders on government intervention against the systematic risk.
Fair value disclosure is based on the marking-to-market principle in the sense that the value of assets should be recorded at market or transaction prices. This disclosure mechanism has a controversial effect on financial market. The advantage of fair value disclosure is its enhancement of the balance sheets informational relevance, allowing investors to better update their risk profiles, and enabling policy makers to supervise the market efficiently. However, fair value disclosure cannot track asset value to its fundamental value when facing market price shocks. Price convergence toward fundamental value is better characterized as a process, which is accomplished through the interplay between noise traders and information arbitrageurs. Consequently, driven by continuous short-term market fluctuations, market price does not necessarily reflect an assets fundamental value. Tracking to market price, therefore, can lead to excessive and artificial volatility in asset value.
The basic premise underlying the regulation design is that fair value of financial assets and liabilities better enables investors, creditors, and other users of financial statements to assess the consequences of an entity's investment and financing strategies. Previous research proposes markto-market disclosure, arguing that this disclosure method reflects the true (and relevant) value of the items on a companys balance sheets. This, in turn, will allow investors and policy makers to better assess their risk profiles, and undertake more timely market discipline and corrective actions (Park et al. (1999) ). However, Hodder et al. (2006) find that the volatility of fair-value income is more than three times that of comprehensive income, and more than five times that of net income. The research results suggest that full-fair-value income volatility reflects elements of risk that are not captured by volatility in net income or comprehensive income, and tracks more closely to the capital market pricing of that risk than either net income volatility or comprehensive income volatility.
Triggered by the crisis from long-term capital management (LTCM) and the serial bankruptcy crisis that started with Bear Stearns, the literature on asset liquidity has received much attention in recent years. It is now widely accepted that the liquidity of financial assets changes over time, and that these time variations are governed by a significant common component in the liquidity across assets (see, e.g., Chordia et al. (2000)), or named commonality in liquiditythe sensitivity of each firms liquidity to variations in market liquidity (Kamara et al. (2008) . Chordia et al. (2000) find the liquidity indexes (such as quoted spreads, quoted depth, and effective spreads) co-move with market-and industry-wide liquidity. Kamara et al. (2008) find that the commonality in liquidity has increased significantly for large firms, but has declined significantly for small firms. They find that increases in institutional ownership are associated with increases in the stocks sensitivity to systematic liquidity shocks because institutional investing and index trading are much more prevalent in large stocks than in small stocks.
In Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009), for instance, a large market shock triggers the switch to allow liquidity, high margin equilibrium, where markets are illiquid, resulting in larger margin requirements. This illiquidity spiral further restricts dealers from providing market liquidity.
The coordination failure models of Morris and Shin (2004) show that traders face differing trading limits that cause them to sell. Because one trader hitting his or her limit may push down the price, causing other traders to hit their limits, early liquidation gives a better price than late liquidation. In this situation of negative shocks, traders rush to liquidate, and when prices fall enough, liquidity black holes emergea condition analogous to a model of runs on banks. Vayanos (2004) presents an asset pricing model where investors have to liquidate when asset prices fall below a lower boundary, leading to liquidation risk being priced. Additionally, Vayanos (2004) shows a link between the risk of need to liquidate and volatility, especially for stocks with significant exposure to market volatility.
While the exact details of these theoretical models differ, they all predict that large market declines will increase the demand for liquidity as agents liquidate their positions across many assets and reduce the supply of liquidity as liquidity providers hit their wealth or funding constraints.
Hameed et al. (2010) find that negative market returns decrease stock liquidity, especially during times of tightness in the funding market. They also conclude that the downward movement of the liquidity supply leads to contagion in illiquidity. Plantin et al. (2008) propose that strategic concerns create procyclical trades that destabilize prices in the mark-to-market regime, while strategic concerns result in countercyclical trades that reduce fundamental volatility in the historical cost regime. Cifuentes et al. (2005) find that when the markets demand for illiquid assets is less than perfectly elastic, sales by distressed institutions depress the market prices of such assets. Marking to market of the asset book can induce a further round of endogenously generated sales of assets, depressing prices further and inducing further sales. Contagious failures can result from small shocks. They investigate the theoretical basis for contagious failures and quantify them through simulation exercises. Liquidity requirements on institutions can be as effective as capital requirements in forestalling contagious failures. Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) found that liquidity providers ability in providing liquidity to the market depends on the market value of their portfolio positions, which in turn is determined by the overall stock market movements. Hence, stock value and stock liquidity mutually reinforce with each other.
Market microstructure model predict that trading cost increase with the information asymmetry in the market (Kyle (1985) ; Glosten and Milgrom (1985) ) The trading cost that a risk neutral market maker charges to protect himself against adverse selection increases with information asymmetry. Kyle (1985) models this cost as the price impact of trade, λ i = 1/2 σ σu . λ i is the illiquidity measure of stock i . Higher λ i implies larger price impact of order flow. Kyle (1985) shows that lamda is proportional of the standard deviation of the possible distribution of fair values of stock , σ.
and inversely proportional to the standard deviation of trades by noise investors, σ u . Through the mark-to-market regime, fair value disclosure forces the fluctuation of firm asset value to co-move with that of the market, leading to the convergence of individual stock liquidity to market liquidity. showing that bailouts that reduce ex post inefficiency will sometimes enhance the incentives for governments to intervene.
III. Model Specification

A. The Association between Marking-to-Market Disclosure and Commonality in Liquidity
To examine whether fair value disclosure is associated with an increase in systematic liquidity, I empirically investigate the association between fair value disclosure and commonality in liquidity.
I investigate whether commonality in liquidity will increase more as the reporting policy becomes more fair-value-oriented. Accordingly, I estimate the following model:
The dependent variable, Systembeta i,t , is the sensitivity of stock liquidity to the variations in market liquidity, or named commonality in liquidity. The event window in this paper is [-3, 3] , from 3 months before to 3 months after the announcement month. Hence, I set dummy variable, After, equal to 1 if Systembeta i,t is in event month 0, 1, 2 and 3. FVA is the ratio of the sum of assets and liabilities (available-for-sale securities, trading financial assets, derivative contracts, trading financial liabilities) recognized or disclosed at fair value in my sample to the sum of the total assets of these companies. Other control variables (Controls) include: time span for being listed firms (Age), Logsize (log form of outstanding float of A shares), capital structure (total debt ratio at year end, Lev). Industry dummy variables for the twelve industry categories used by the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) are denoted as Inds.
As the hypotheses predict, I expect that: (β 3 i,t > 0, meaning that fair value disclosure will bring about convergence of the sensitivity of each firms liquidity with variations in market liquidity after the announcement of fair value disclosure information.
B. The Association between Liquidity Dry-up, Commonality in Liquidity and the Impact of Government Guarantee Effect
In addition, I study the government guarantee effect on mitigating liquidity dry-up. The effect of government's intervention to stock market is still controversial, however, it is without doubt that firms can be better off by having government act as an insurance broker. When the firms confront with extremely liquidity shock, ex post policy intervention from government can easily transfer funds from public tax payer to firms. Compared to private supplied liquidity by risk arbitrageurs, the ability of government to provide liquidity ex post gives it a potential advantage in the sense that it occurs less opportunity cost. An ex post government intervention does not waste resource in advance, especially when covering liquidity shortage that occur rarely. Accordingly, I estimate the following model:
I study the result of different characteristics of ultimate shareholders. State is a dummy variable, with 1 indicating that the ultimate shareholder is the government and 0 otherwise. As the hypotheses predict, I expect that: β 2 i,t < 0, meaning that the impact of commonality in liquidity will tend to be mitigated under government guarantee effect.
IV. Data and Variable Description
A. Data
The research data for this study includes daily market data, financial data, and industry data from all the public companies in China's stock markets, obtained from the Wind Info database. The China Stock Market and Accounting Research (CSMAR) database serves as the primary source for ultimate owners data.
The sample of ownership includes two ownership categories: (1) non-state firms, for which the ultimate owners are non-government units such as entrepreneurs, townships and villages, and foreign companies, and (2) state-owned firms, which are owned by local governments (e.g., the Bureau of State Assets Management and the Finance Bureau) or central government (e.g., the Ministry of Finance and the Central Industrial Enterprises Administration Committee), which is coded as "21 "of the first two digit number of ultimate control owner database from CSMAR. 
B. Variable Description
Illiquidity is not a simple concept that can be directly observed, yet it is generally associated with the price impact induced by trades. The daily liquidity measure used for this study is based on Amihud's (2002) measure of a firms stock illiquidity, which is calculated as the ratio of the absolute value of daily return over the dollar volume, a measure that corresponds to the notion of price impact. Thus, I caclulate the ILLIQ i,d as
where r i,d is the daily stock return. (2008) . Specifically, for each firm i and day t, I define , the change in the firms illiquidity, as
Following Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2000) and Kamara, Lou, and Sadka (2008), I run the following regression for each firm i by month:
where β LIQ (Systembeta t ) measure the sensitivity of changes in firm's liquidity to changes in aggregate liquidity. 
V. Empirical Results
A. Sample Description
B. The Association between Marking-to-Market Disclosure and Commonality in Liquidity
In the second part of this study, I explored the underlying channel that mediates the positive correlation between fair value disclosure and commonality in stock liquidity, to see how fair value disclosure causes liquidity dry-up in Chinas stock market.
From the perspective of the supply side of the liquidity provider, the ability to provide liquidity accounts for fair value disclosure's accelerating effect on the contagion of market decline. Fair value disclosure requires marking-to-market measurements, which connects the movement of the supplier's financial assets value with the whole market. If a securitys market value moves with the whole market, the liquidity of that security will converge to the liquidity of the whole market. A significant market-wide decline in stock prices reduces the liquidity available to the supply side, and constrains the liquidity supplier's ability to provide liquidity to a specific security, which in turn causes stock liquidity decline.
The results of Regression Equation (1) are reported in Model 2 and Model 3. The coefficient of F V A t in Model 2, is positive and significant. Thus, there is evidence of a positive correlation between commonality in liquidity and a more fair value disclosure oriented reporting regime. The coefficient of Af ter t * F V A t in Model 3, is positive and significant. This result indicates that after disclosure marking-to-market information will increase commonality in liquidity. Table 3 reports the results of the impact of commonality in liquidity on stock liquidity and the mitigating effect from government guarantee. The regression specification used is Eq. (2).
C. The Association between Stock illiquidity, Commonality in Liquidity and the Impact of Government Guarantee
As note earlier, the variable of interest to investigate the impact of government guarantee effect on the stock liquidity is the interaction term between commonality in liquidity and government ownership. To the extent that stock with government ownership will experience relative lower commonality in liquidity effect toward liquidity dry-up, the coefficient of Systembeta t * State is expected to be negative.
The first column in Table 3 show the results that the relation between variation in stock liquidity and commonality in liquidity. The coefficient on Systembeta t in first column is positive and significant, indicating that stock with higher liquidity commonality will experience lower stock liquidity.
The second column in Table 3 presents the results that the relation between variation in liquidity and the interaction term between Systembeta t and State t . The coefficient on Systembeta t * State t in second column is negative as expected. The results imply that government ownership can provide guarantee signals to mitigate the impact of commonality liquidity risk on stock liquidity dry-up.
D. The effect of Commonality in Liquidity on the Variation in Stock Liquidity in Months with Market Distress
To investigate the relationship between systematically liquidity dry-up and market spiral meltdown, I investigate the association between commonality in liquidity and variation in stock liquidity in months with market distress as follows:
Distress is set to 1 if the market experienced distress. This paper examines the different degrees of market distress, labeled as Distress1, Distress2, and Distress3. Distress1 is set to 1 if the market experienced negative return, and 0 otherwise. Distress2 and Distress3 are set to 1 if the market return is at the lowest 10 %or 5%, respectively, and 0 otherwise. As the hypotheses predict, I expect that: β 4 i,t > 0, meaning that the impact of distress will tend to increase the illiquidity effect. The results of regression Equation (6) are reported in Table 4 . The coefficient of the interaction term, Af ter t * Systembeta * Distress , is positive and significant. Thus, there is evidence of a positive correlation between the commonality in liquidity during market distress and the speed of market liquidity dry-up.
E. Marking-to-Market Disclosure and the Liquidity Dry-up Channel under Different Ultimate Control Right
This study further tests the liquidity dry-up channel in state-own firms and non-state firms via adopting fair value disclosure. The Model 1, 3, 5, and 7 of Table 5 are the results for non-state firms, and the remaining column of Table 5 are for state own firms.
In model 1 of Table 5 , it shows that non-state firms adopt fair value disclosure induces the co-movement of the individual financial assets market value with the whole market, and leads to liquidity dry-up during the market decline. The coefficient of Af ter t * F V A t is positive and significant. Thus, there is evidence of a positive correlation between commonality in liquidity and a more fair value disclosure oriented reporting regime in non-state firms. On the contrary, in model 2, the coefficient of Af ter t * F V A t is not significant for state own firms.
In Model 3, 5 and 7, the coefficient of the interaction term, Af ter t * Systembeta * Distress, is positive and significant. Thus, there is evidence of a positive correlation between the commonality in liquidity during market distress and the speed of market liquidity dry-up, among non-state firms.
An interest finding is that the correlation is increasing in the degree of market distress. Similar to model 1, the coefficient of Af ter t * Systembeta * Distress is not significant for state own firms.
These result above indicate that state own firms are relatively less influenced by the consequence of the co-movement of the individual financial assets' market value with the whole market.
VI. Additional Analysis
A. The Association between Fair Value Accounting and Market Decline Contagion
To examine whether fair value disclosure is associated with an increase in systematic market decline, I empirically investigate the association between fair value disclosure and the contagion effect of market decline. I investigate whether, when downward returns occur on a given month at the market level, a firm will also experience poor returns. In addition, I use the interaction term of fair value disclosure and market distress to test whether the return will decrease more as the reporting policy has become more fair-value oriented. A similar approach is adopted in Boyson, Stahel, and Stulz (2008) to examine contagion. Accordingly, I estimate the following model:
The dependent variable, Dayretave, is the average daily stock return per month for stock i. The event window in this paper is [-3, 3] , from 3 months before to 3 months after the announcement month. Hence, I set dummy variable, After, equal to 1 if Dayretave is in event month 0, 1, 2 and 3. Distress is set to 1 if the market experienced distress. This paper examines the different degrees of market distress, labeled as Distress1, Distress2, and Distress3. Distress1 is set to 1 if the market experienced negative return, and 0 otherwise. Distress2 and Distress3 are set to 1 if the market return is at the lowest 10 %or 5%, respectively, and 0 otherwise. FVA is the ratio of the sum of assets and liabilities (available-for-sale securities, trading financial assets, derivative contracts, trading financial liabilities) recognized or disclosed at fair value in my sample to the sum of the total assets of these companies.
I expect that: β 4 i,t < 0, suggesting that the more fair-value-oriented disclosure will tend to accelerate the contagion effect of market crisis.
I investigate the market-wide contagion effect on individual stock return in Eq. (6). I define the downward effect of market decline on individual stock return as market wide contagion. I also investigate whether this contagion is accelerated by fair value disclosure. This is measured by the interaction term of After, FVA and Distress. Table 6 reports the regression result of Eq. (7). In all of the three models, the coefficient of Distress is negative and statistically significant, presenting the contagion effect from market decline.
In addition, the coefficient of the interaction term, Af ter t * F V A t * Distress , is negative and statistically significant, which indicates that during market distress, for firms adopting fair-valueoriented regime, their average stock return is lower after the announcement of fair-value disclosure on earning announcement date. This implies firms are susceptive to marketwide downside contagion through fair value disclosure. Table 7 reports the fair value disclosure oriented reporting regime and the degree of market decline contagion between state firms and non-state firms. In Models 1, 3, and 5, the coefficient for Distress, Distress 1, Distress 2, and Distress 3, is negative and significant, standing for the contagion effect from the market level return downward. In addition, the coefficients of the corresponding interaction term between After, FVA and Distress, i.e., Af ter t * F V A t * Distress2 and Af ter t * F V A t * Distress3, is negative and statistically significant, which suggests that a more fair-valueoriented disclosure regime is associated with an increase in contagion in market distress. An interesting finding from Model 3 and Model 5, is that the coefficient the above interaction terms for non government-backed firms is greater than that of government-backed firms (Model 4 and Model 6). It implies that during a period of severe market crisis, the government-backed firms acquiring more implicit financial support or a bailout from the government or investors expect that the government will announce good news or commitment to support those companies and, in turn, eliminate the accelerating contagion effect from market distress.
In all aspects, these results would be evidence consistent with the hypothesis that a more fairvalue-oriented disclosure regime is associated with a greater increase in market downward contagion during periods of market distress.
VII. Conclusion
Any mechanism design will have inherent limitations in application. In an historical disclosure mechanism, for example, a short-sighted manager may dispose of profitable financial assets while retaining assets with financial loss. This kind of mechanism may provide weaker relevant disclosure information, but its counter-cyclical effect with market price change can lower both the volatility and the systematic risk of security price. On the contrary, fair value disclosure reflects timely information on market price, but due to the impact of unstable market price and relevant regulatory limitation, the mechanism of fair value disclosure will induce the manager to hold financial assets when market price rises, and sell them before the price drop.
From the perspective of the supply side of liquidity, a liquidity suppliers ability to provide liquidity is constrained by the market value of the portfolio in the security market, which in turn is determined by the movement of market price. Therefore, when a market declines, that market will face the problem of decreasing liquidity.
I hypothesize that through the mark-to-market regime, fair value disclosure forces the fluctuation of firm asset value to co-move with that of the market, leading to the convergence of individual stock liquidity to market liquidity. I investigate the relation between fair value disclosure and commonality in liquidity by examining how fair value measurements contribute to the commonality in liquidity of stock list in China stock market. Commonality in liquidity between individual stocks and the market makes it impossible to diversify away the risk. Therefore, a sudden liquidation demand will force stock prices to drop quickly, and other investors holding that same stock have to dispose of the security due to the same liquidity problem. This results in a cyclical market price drop and the dry-up of systematic liquidity for the overall financial system. On that basis, this paper explores the effect of fair value disclosure on the security market, and its relationship with the contagion in financial crisis.
I also find stock with higher liquidity commonality will experience lower stock liquidity and how government guarantee effect mitigate the impact of liquidity commonality risk. My contribution is in analyzy the systematic liquidity risk and the response of government guarantee effect to market liquidity downside pressure, an important signal to fight liquidity freeze. (Dayretave) , the extent to which the disclosure regime is fair-value-oriented (FVA), commonality in liquidity (Systembeta), and the log form of market value of publicly tradable shares (or float) of A shares (LOGSIZE). Illiquidity (ILLIQ) is based on Amihud's (2002) measure of a firms stock illiquidity, which is calculated as the ratio of the absolute value of daily return over the dollar volume, a measure that corresponds to the notion of price impact. Age is the time span for the listed firms. Lev is the total debt ratio. State is a dummy variable, 1 indicating that the ultimate shareholder is the government, and 0 otherwise. This paper examines the different degree of market distress: Distress1, Distress2, and Distress3. Distress1 is set to 1 if the market is experiencing negative returns. Distress2 and Distress3 are set to 1 if the market return is the lowest 10% or 5%, respectively. Lev represents capital structure (total debt ratio at year end). Inds are the industry dummy variables for the twelve industry categories used by the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC). *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
